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ABSTRACT 
An investigation comparing energy media for use with power tools in a 
space environment is presented. The tools will be used in space for operations 
such as manufacture, .assembly, maintenance, and emergency repair. The 
criteria for this study are safety and reliability of gas, electric and hydraulic 
power systems. The potential hazard of each energy medium is discussed 
separately. The hydraulic power system presents a major fire hazard. The 
gas power system may produce toxicants if exhaust gases are expelled in the 
spacecraft environment. The electricpower system may create ozone, a toxic 
gas, particularly when brush arcing takes place. One recommendation is to 
use a brushless dc power system using a solid state electronic switching system 
to replace the brush-commutated do motor, thereby eliminating brush arcing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A previous study compared various space tool power sources with respect 
to power/mass requirements.' This report presents the results of a continuing 
study directed primarily at the safety and reliability of the possible power sources 
to be used as a multi-purpose driving unit for hand-operated tools. 
The potential power sources are divided into two basic safety groups, 
those involving fuels and/or power cycles which are normally considered to 
be inherently extra-hazardous and those involving fuels and/or power cycles 
which are normally considered to be of low 'inherent hazard. Other areas of 
discussion included in this report are: 
1. Safety considerations for gas, electric, and hydraulic power. 
2. Fire and blast hazards. 
3. Toxicological hazard. 
4. Special tool hazards. 
Conclusions with recommendations are drawn as to the safest and most 
reliable power source for space use. 
INITIAL SELECTION 
All the potential power sources can easily be placed initially into two 
basic safety groupings. 
1. Those power sources involving fuels and/or power- cycles which are 
normally considered to be inherently extra-hazardous. 
2. Those power sources involving fuels and/or power cycles which are 
normally considered to be of low inherent hazard. 
Space Tool Power Source Investigation. Internal Note R-ME-67-4. 
The inherently extra-hazardous class includes all the solid and liquid rocket 
propellant-oxidizer combinations and the monopropellants such as hydrazine 
and hydrogen peroxide. 
These high energy materials are inherently hazardous since they are 
highly reactive, frequently unstable, and relatively toxic, with very low threshold 
limit values (TLV). Low allowable concentration percentages apply to these 
materials as separately stored fuel or oxidizer components and as reaction 
products. Their maximum allowable concentrations (MAC) from a flammability­
limit standpoint are also low. As highly reactive agents they may be ignited 
by low-energy ignition sources; some are hypergolic. They usually combine 
or disassociate at high temperatures; therefore, the reaction chambers, and 
frequently the exhaust products, must be carefully and completely isolated from 
astronaut proximity. These extra-hazardous power sources have been developed 
for specialzed space use and previously have been used on manned space flights. 
However, the location requirements for thrust engines, spacecraft attitude 
controllers, extravehicular activity (EVA) maneuvering units, and other special 
uses are much less severe than the location and use requirements placed on the 
space tool power source. 
It is possible that this category of power source could qualify for special­
ized EVA such as a high power/mass emergency tool [ 1]. However, as long as 
the power source may be used within the cabin, these extra-hazardous systems 
should be eliminated from the candidate list. This conclusion and the considera­
tions in arriving at it are in agreement with that proposed by Both [2]. 
The initial selection leaves as potentially useable power sources only 
the normally low-hazard power systems. This category includes gas (air) 
powered, electric powered, and hydraulic power systems [.]. All three of 
these systems are used on Earth as tool power sources. 
Several previous space tool power sources have used do electric motors 
[4, 51. The characteristics of this type electric motor are very favorable for use 
as a tool power source. The do electric motor's high efficiency, high power-to­
weight ratio, and torque/load characteristics make it one of the most suitable 
electric motors for hand tool use. In addition, spacecraft electric power systems 
usually include several dc prime power sources. This is true because of the 
basic dc nature of these devices, i.e., solar cells, thermoelectric, batteries, 
and/or fuel cells. The dc motor is a natural choice since it can use power 
directly from these prime spacecraft power sources. 
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Previous considerations have eliminated all the exotic high-energy gas 
cycles. This leaves the low-energy, pressure-work type gas cycle as used in 
all terrestrial gas (air) powered hand tools. These motors use air at line 
pressure developing power across a work-surface area; little or no work is 
obtained by gas expansion and the gas reaches the exhaust port at practically 
line pressure. 
True turbine motors do not operate well on this power source [61. They 
have even lower starting torques than turbine motors operating on more effective 
turbine power cycles. Except for very specialized light loads, high-speed gas­
powered turbines are not considered to be valuable as a space power system. 
Only two types, the piston and the rotating-vane, remain as of major importance. 
The piston motor is generally heavier and bulkier, and is usually not offered in 
tools under 373 W to 559 W (0. 5 to 0. 75 hp). The vane-type gas pressure motor 
will be the major gas motor considered in this report. 
In the early stages of investigating the safety aspects of pneumatic power 
sources it was felt that a closed fluid working cycle might offer several safety 
advantages over the pneumatic. Therefore the safety aspects of hydraulic tool 
power will also be considered, 
Hydraulic systems are mainly power transmission devices and are not 
prime power sources. The hydraulic system will have to be driven by a gas or 
electric prime power source and it will have some of the advantages and dis­
advantages associated with the chosen prime power source. 
SAFETY CONS IDERATI ONS FOR GAS, ELECTR I C,
 
AND HYDRAULIC POWER
 
Even though the three remaining candidate power systems are considered 
safe in normal terrestrial use, their use in space flight poses several unusual 
problems of some potential danger. These specialized problems can be reduced 
to three categories: 
i. Fire and blast. 
2. Toxicological contamination. 
3. Safety hazards peculiar to the type of tool. 
The three types of power sources will now be considered within these three 
potential hazard areas. 
S 
FIRE AND BLAST 
Two very different use environments apply to the proposed tool power 
source, EVA or intravehicular activity (IVA). In EVA use, the accidental fire 
or blast hazard is much reduced from that found for-similar tools in terrestrial 
use [ 2, 7]. This is primarily a result of the unavailability of a natural supply 
of oxygen in the space vacuum environment. Most liquid' or gaseous fuels or 
oxidizers will be vented naturally and dispersed by this very 'low pressure. Also, 
a decrease in pressure usually narrows the flammability range and increases the 
auto-ignition temperature [ 8] . 
Another factor which will reduce the chance of orbital EVA fire is the 
unusual "zero-gravity" gravitation field. Zero gravity, in the absence of induced 
relative velocities, will reduce the mixing process to either a random low­
velocity mixing, or diffusion-controlled mixing. Either process is less effective 
than mixin g driven by displacement convection between "heavier and lighter" 
liquids and gases. 
The normal terrestrial convection-burning process can also be affected 
by zero gravity. Spalding lists the equation for the burning of fuel vapor drop­
lets in air [ 9]. 
k = (45B) 0.75 [ad 0.25 
where M = Vaporization rate per unit face area. 
d = Droplet sphere diameter 
c = Specific heat 
k = Thermal conductivity 
B = Transfer number, a fuel function 
- = Acceleration due to gravity 
= Thermal diffusivity 
4 
Even though the equation indicates so, the conclusion, obviously cannot be made 
that the burning rate is -zero when g is zero. Roth suggests an equation of the -
form [ 2] 
ME= M0 [1 + f (g)]g o 
The function f (g) would be relatively small compared with unity, and the sub­
scripts g and o refer to gravity and zero-gravity cases. In any case the lack of 
normal convection current per se will reduce the major natural oxygen replenish­
ment mechanism found operating in an Earth atmosphere (convective) fire. 
The extravehicular environment is considered by most authors as a 
natural fire extinguisher for fires that may break out even inside the cabin. 
The procedure suggested is to depressurize the cabin to the exterior vacuum 
in case of internal cabin fire. 
It has been shown that fire hazards increase in space flight; therefore, 
the major increased fire hazard in space flight must arise from the special 
conditions 6f IVA and not EVA. 
Several extensive studies have been accomplished aimed at defining the 
extra hazards introduced within the space cabin in space flight. Final and exact 
answers to thesequestions must await combustion experiments scheduled for 
future flights. It is known that past flights with 100-percent oxygen cabin 
atmospheres were relatively more hazardous than an Earth environment. Not 
only may more oxygen be available but the lack of a diluent atmospheric gas 
also contributes to the shortened time scale and higher temperature of com­
bustion found in cabin fires under 100 percent oxygen atmospheres. 
No attempt will be made here to reassess or restate these extensive 
studies except 'to accept the environment as. a potentially more positive fire 
risk and to reference prior test data as it specifically applies to operation of 
or to materials of construction of the space tool power source. 
The Power Tool as an Ignition Source 
All power tools have certain common potentials as ignition sources. 
In this function the tool would serve to ignite another fuel or combustible. 
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This is the major terrestrial dahger considered for constructing and using 
nonsparking tools in highly combustille or explosive atmospheres. The problem 
may be more severe in space cabin atmospheres. Minimum ignition energies 
are lowered with increased oxygen partial pressure [10]. Huggett et al. 
showed slightly lower ignition energies for some common materials required in 
space cabin atmospheres as compared to ignition in air [ ii]. 
According to Voigtsberger [ 12] and Roth [ 2] the spark energies required 
to ignite common clothing materials may be decreased more than one thousand 
fold in pure oxygen to levels similar to those of electrostatic sparks from the 
human frame. The rate of burning after ignition of some common space cabin 
materials may increase by five fold on replacing air with oxygen. Propagation 
of flame may be much faster in.the gas phase [ 13]. There are certain ignition 
source modes which are common to every tool regardless of the type of power 
source. These are discussed in the paragraphs below. 
Electrostatic Sparks. In general, the grounded all-metal tool housing 
would not be expected to build up or hold an electrostatic charge in normal use. 
Electrostatic spark potentials can be accumulated only on parts of a device 
which remain electrically isolated for a sufficient period. Under certain con­
ditions aluminum alloy housings, as might be used in all types of tool housing, 
could become electrostatically dangerous. 
Aluminum is a chemically reactive material, especially with respect to 
its combination with oxygen. The aluminum oxide product is highly adherent to 
the base aluminum, is chemically inert, hard, dense, mechanically strong, and 
serves to protect the base aluminum from further oxidation and other chemical 
attack. Aluminum oxide is also a dielectric material. Its formation on the 
aluminum surface, especially under dry atmosphere conditions, can create an 
electrically isolated surface which could store an electrostatic charge. 
Frequently aluminum products are processed through one of the anodizing 
processes. Anodizing processes control the formation of aluminum oxide on the 
aluminum surface; usually it is done to give the surface a harder, more wear 
resistant finish of from 25 to 26 pm (1 to 3 mils) thickness. The "hard coat" 
process is a special anodizing process which gives a surface from 177. 8 to 
304.8 gui (7 to 12 mils) or more and is especially long-wearing and abrasion­
resistant.
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Such coatings pose a hazard and should be avoided to reduce the electro­
static spark hazard from aluminum surfaces. Further, should aluminum be 
preferred because of its other properties to another nonsparking alloy, such 
as beryllium-copper, which does not exhibit the tendency to auto-oxidize to 
a dielectric surface, then special surface finishes should be developed for the 
aluminum housing. Such surface finishes would coat the aluminum with a thin, 
conductive, nonsparking, non-auto-oxidizing material. Care must be taken in 
such a coating process to insure that the coating is applied directly on the 
aluminum base metal. An equally dangerous capacitive spark sburce can be 
created should a conductive coating be placed over the aluminum oxide coating. 
The vane air tool has another type potential electrostatic hazard. The 
rotating vanes themselves are usually manufactured of phenolic-impregnated 
linen-fiber material. This material can generate electrostatic sparks which 
would discharge vane-to-housing. The high moisture conditions of most 
delivery air in terrestrial maintenance shops would serve to reduce or eliminate 
such a condition here on Earth. In a dry atmosphere the high rotational speed 
might help compensate for the low insulated surface (vane) area and an electro­
static spark hazard would exist within the air tool. Development of conductive 
vane materials or conductive surface coatings would eliminate this hazard in 
the air tool. 
Switch Sparks. The electric motor as a primary space tool power source, 
or as the power drive in a hydraulic system, would have whatever ignition hazard 
is offered by sparking at an on-off motor switch. The gas power source does 
not offer this particular hazard. By definition such sparking can occur only 
between the contact points in the switch. The problem of the ejecta-spark, or 
ejected hot particle, as an ignition source is treated separately in this report. 
The physical arrangement of such electrodes is such that the practical danger 
of a fire being initiated by this spark is offered only to ignite that fuel supply 
which can be brought to the spark, i. e., passed between the electrodes. Gaseous 
fuel-oxidizer mixes meet this requirement and will be treated as the only 
probable fire threat offered by the switch spark. The major space flight atmos­
pheric variables of the type of gaseous composition, the percentage of oxygen, 
and the total pressure affect both the minimum electric gap length required to 
ignite a given gaseous fuel-oxygen mix and also the minimum voltage for the 
production of the spark [ ii, 14, 15]. 
Short-time sparks supply the energy necessary for ignition in a few 
microseconds. This energy triggers the chemical reaction (flame) in a very 
small sphere of the combustible mixture. For some time it has been known 
that continuation of the flame front and development of a general fire will 
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depend on whether the small initial sphere can propagate without being extin­
guished [ 2]. The electrode gap may act as a quenching agent on this small 
flame. Figure 1 shows the dependence of the critical (minimum) energy for 
ignition on the gap length. 
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From this graph it can be seen that gap lengths shorter than the minimum 
will require greater spark energies to propagate combustion. A spark gap will 
begin to dissipate its energy almost immediately in the case of "break" sparks, 
the left hand branch of the curve. In this case the close spacing of the operating 
contacts may serve to quench the process. This indicates that "make" sparks 
will be more dangerous than "break" sparks. There are other factors operating 
in break sparks in motor circuits, however, which makes the energy available 
in motor circuit "break" sparks more than that energy available to the switch 
in "make" sparks. These effects will be considered later. 
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The minimum ignition energy also depends on the fuel-air ratio for any 
given combustible mixture (Fig. 2). 
The relative diffusivity of the fuel is also a control on the minimum 
ignition energy. For a homologous series of hydrocarbon fuels the minimum 
iginition energy shifts toward higher stoichiometric fuel-air ratios. 
A practical demonstration of the wide variation of minimum ignition-gap 
length on oxygen concentration for two common gaseous hydrocarbon fuels 
(gasoline and ethyl ether) is shown in Figure 3. As the percentage of oxygen 
in the air is varied from 20 to 75 percent, the minimum spark gap for ignition 
of gasoline decreases from 0. 089 mm down to 0. 001 mm. These test results 
show the minimum spark gap required to ignite a gaseous fuel at atmospheric 
pressure decreases by a factor of more than 10 when the oxygen concentration 
is increased from 20 percent to above 75 percent. 
Figure 4 shows the effective increase of the fire-ignition hazard with 
increasing oxygen concentration. It decreases with decreasing total pressure. 
From atmospheric pressure i01.35 X j & N/m 2 absolute (14.7 psia) down to 
19. 99 x 103 N/m 2 absolute (2.9 psia) the minimum ignition energy decreases 
by a factor of 10. 
The data of Figures 3, 5, and 6 taken together indicate that in the current 
space cabin atmosphere and those found on projects Mercury and Gemini, the 
overall result of increasing the oxygen concentration to 100 percent and decreasing 
the total pressure to 24. 13 x 103 to 37. 92 x 103 N/m 2 absolute (2.5 to 5.5 psia), 
decreases the minimum spark ignition energy by an overall factor of 12 to 70. 
In considering the development of sparks at switch contacts there are 
two separate and different conditions: The "make" spark and the "break" spark. 
The "make" spark, or breakdown potential, Vb is a function of the type gas 
and the product, 6S, where 6 is the density of the gas and S the gap width. Con­
sidering the temperature to be constant, we may replace this product with pS, 
where p is atmospheric (or space cabin) pressure and S is electrode gap width. 
This similitude law is known as Paschen's law. Figure 6 shows a plot of Vb 
versus the product pS. 
The minimum breakdown voltage of 330 volts, occurs at pS = 9. 117 
N/m 2 -cm (2 x i0 - 3 atm-cm). This general curve of Paschen has been re­
produced by the data of more recent investigators [ 16]. Recently Germer 
[17-19] investigated very closely spaced electrodes down to a spacing of 
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- 5iX 10 cm (1000 A). He found arc ignition below Paschen's minimum of 330 
volts, even down as low as 50 volts . Arc ignition at these very close spacings 
is explained as resulting from very high field concentrations occurring at surface 
asperity peaks. 
Most electric tools in the range of consideration of this report will hse 
power circuit voltages much lower than Paschen's minimum ignition voltage 
and even considerably lower than the 50 volts found at extremely close spacings 
by Germer. The conclusion is that "make" sparks in tools using 30 volts or 
less do not constitute an ignition hazard from the "make" spark switch source. 
An interesting aspect of combining the information from the data obtained 
from Figures 3, 4, and 6 is presented in Figure 5. Considering a cabin atmos­
phere of more than 80 percent oxygen content and a minimum gap length in this 
atmosphere which will ignite most low molecular weight hydrocarbons 0. 0025 cm 
(0. 001 in. ) we calculate and plot the curve of Paschen's breakdown potential 
versus gap-pressure. This composite curve shows several important facts 
relevant to the operation of electrical switches under space cabin and space 
flight conditions: 
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1. The electrical breakdown gap length is a minimum in the 100 percent 
oxygen atmosphere at between 39. 99 x i0 3 N/m 2 absolute (5.8 psia) and 
20. 68 x 10O N/m 2 absolute (3.0 psia). This pressure range is precisely 
that range in which past and present spacecraft atmospheres have been 
operated. 
2. Pressures lower or higher than the range 20.68 X Ao' to 39. 99 x 103 
N/,m2 absolute decrease the danger of development and ignition of "make" 
sparks. The lowest pressure (EVA) is considered a much lower risk. 
The reduction of "make spark" risk at high pressures suggests that the 
solution should be a hermetically-sealed pressurized switch. 
3. Reducing the electrode voltages below 330 volts, especially below 
50 volts, practically eliminates "make" spark risk. 
The "break" spark is fundamentally different from the "make" spark. 
There are two major differences which apply to the conditions just preceding the 
creation of the "break" phenomenon as compared to the "make" condition: 
i. The surfaces are in mechanical contact. 
2. Some parts of the surfaces are carrying the circuit current (I . 
Considerable work has been done on the nature of contact of these surfaces 
[15, 6, 20]. The actual area of mechanical contact, even for the smoothest 
surfaces, is at most about 0. 1 percent of the apparent mechanical contact area. 
The electrically conducting area is even smaller and on the order of 0. 1 percent 
of the mechanical contact surface. The conducting spots or constriction areas 
are thin highly-conductive bridges. The bridges are formed by a process called 
fritting. "A" fritting generally means the breakdown of insulating films originally 
found covering the contact surfaces. This breakdown is accompanied by local 
conduction, intense localized heating of these conducting points, and melting of 
the fritting spot with subsequent formation of the molten conducting bridges [15]. 
The actual conducting area is small and the current density in the areas is very 
high. Contacts carrying only a few amperes, such as a switch cutting the power 
to an electrically powered hand tool, may have current densities of the order of 
108 amps/cm 2. The importance of this high current density passing through the 
resistance is not found in its electrical resistance, which is usually only milli­
ohms, but in its thermal capacity. Most of the energy lost in passing through 
the contact surfaces is lost as heat energy (1c2R c) generated in the immediate 
vicinity of the conducting aspherities. Because of the small thermal capacity 
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the spots exist at higher temperatures. The second stage of the process of 
fritting, called "B"31fritting, operates in such a way as to keep the bridges 
molten. If the current increases, "B" fritting generally results in the molten 
spots increasing in size to maintain nearly the same value of constriction 
resistance and to carry the extra current [ 15]. 
Under breaking the contact we start with the molten conducting bridges 
and begin to reduce the normal load. The area of contact decreases and con­
sequently the constriction resistance, current density, and tenperature increase, 
and the material in the bridge vaporizes as the switch opens. The opening switch 
thus creates its own high-temperature, highly-conductive, vaporized metal, 
or plasma path which constitutes the beginning points for the drawn spark or 
arc. Once such a high-temperature vapor path is formed it will draw out a 
spark or arc until either the current or voltage goes below a value necessary to 
maintain the conducting path. These shortest-arc minimum values are known 
as minimum arc current (I ) and minimum arc voltage (V m ) .mm Both of these 
important limits depend on the cathode materials. Values of I and V for 
typical switch contact materials are: 
I V 
m m 
Amps Amps 
Carbon 0. 01 15 - 20 
Silver 0.45 8 - 12 
Copper 0.43 12 
Tungsten 1. 0 10 - 15 
These minimum values are within a range which can be developed in a dc 
space tool power circuit. The conclusion is that "break" sparks are possible 
in the low voltage space tool power circuits and constitute a potential ignition 
hazard. 
The extinguishment of the break-spark hazard is possible if we could 
reduce either the current or voltage before contact separation below the 
minimums. It should be recognized that in power tool systems a further con­
sideration must be made. These circuits contain inductance and capacitance, 
and in dc systems undergoing a transient (switching) condition the inductance 
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serves to supply higher transient circuit voltage values than occur during steady 
electrical conditions. Even though-the -power circuit could be designed and 
operated below the minimum arc current (I ), on switch opening the inductance 
would operate to prevent any circuit changes, and arc would ignite at: 
E-E
 
I ­
0 R
 
where E is the last voltage across the switch contacts. After ignition the circuit 
varies as: 
E = IR + L -9 + V(I,S)dt 
where V (I, S), the spark voltage, is a function of I and are length S. 
The presence of capacitance and inductance in most power circuits may
 
lead to arcing and sparking in circuits otherwise operating below I and V m.
 
The inductance may provide voltages higher than the prime supply voltage 
and pulse currents higher than I may be drawn from the capacitance.
m 
Ejecta Particle Sparks. Several types of hot incandescent particles
 
may be created and ejected by tools:
 
Metal strike sparks. "Sparking" and "non-sparking" metal tools have
 
long been considered in explosive or potentially dangerous atmospheres on
 
Earth. There are two major chances for developing metal strike sparks in
 
space, striking the "toolhousing and metal sparks generated'in the impactor
 
mechanism of some tools.
 
The U. S. Department of Commerce has done research on the sparking 
of metals in an atmosphere which has some relevance to space cabin atmospheres. 
In this work the sparking characteristics and the ignitability of flammable mix­
tures were tested under increasing concentrations of oxygen. The results of 
these tests are summarized in Tables I and I. These tests showed that metals 
safe from strike-sparking, flammable, and explosive high-oxygen atmospheres 
include maganese bronze, phosphorus bronze, aluminum bronze, commercial 
brass, aluminum, and beryllium copper. Unsafe metals include carbon steel, 
carbon'tool steel, stainless steel, and monel (nickel copper). 
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TABLE I. SPARKING CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS METALS IN A 
GASOLINE AND OXYGEN-ENRICHED AIR MIXTURE 
(0. f3 M3 [4.5 ft3] OF AIR WITH 50 PERCENT OXYGEN) 
Rod Specimen 
Material 
Carbon Tool Steel 
II. S. Tool Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
Monel 	(Nickel Copper) 
AManganese Bronze 
Phosphorus Bronze 
Aluminum Bronze 
Commercial Brass 
Aluminum 
Beryllium Copper 
Rockwell 
lrardnes, 
B72 

B92 

1303 
B82 

1M 

;-:1 

L, 

l'i 

B72 

1156 
C22 
Metal Wheels 
Carbon II. S. Tool Alloy Steel 
'Pool Steel Steel ( Blt Rock) 
le (63 Re 66 1c 56 
16 cc Gasolino 
N X X 
NX NK 
. , N 
N N X 
X N 
2S cce(ns1ohlne 
N N N 
N N N 
N(2) N N 
N IN N 
N IN N 
N(2) N 	 N 
Key-	 X - Visible sparks and e.xplosion, 
S - Visible sparks no explosion. 
N - No visible sparks, no explosion. 
Notes. (1) This result is for 28 cc of gasoline. 
(2) Second test conducted on a rusted wheel; 
Stainless 
Steel 
Re 37 
Carbon 
Steel 
Rc 62 
Abrasive 
Wheel 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
S(I1) 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N(2) 
N 
N 
N(2) 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
no visible sparks, no explosion. 
TABLE II. SPARKING CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS METALS IN A
 
GASOLINE AND AIR MIXTURE (20 cc Gasoline 0. i 3 3 [ 4.5 ft3] OF AIR)
 
Rod Specimen Metal Wheels 
Carbon Carbon II. S. Tool Alloy Steel • Stainless Carbon 
Rockwell Tool Steel Tool Steel Steel (Bolt Stock) Steel Steel Abrasive 
Material Hardness Re 63 Rb 72 Re 66 Re 56 Re 37 He 62 wheel 
Carbon Tool Steel B72 X S' S S S S X 
H. S. Tool Steel B92 S S S S S S S 
Stainless Steel 1393 N S S X S IS X 
Carbon Steel 1382 S S S S S S X 
Monel (Nickel Copper) B90 S S S S S S S 
Manganese Bronze B89 N N N N N N N 
Phosphorus Bronze B90 N N N N N N N 
Aluminum Bronze B98 N N N N N N N 
Commercial Brass B72 N N N N N N N 
Aluminum B56. N N N N N N N 
Beryllium Copper C22 N N N N N N N 
Symbols: X - Visible sparks and violent explosion. 
S - Visible sparks, no explosion. 
N - No visible sparks, no explosion. 
A fortunate result from these tests is that aluminum and high-aluminum 
alloys frequently used in the tool housings are non-sparking with respect to 
strike- or abrasion-generated metal sparks. Since regular prediction of metal 
strike-sparks from a tool housing under use by a man is impossible, the only 
approach that can be accepted is to.manufacture the housing of such non-sparking 
materials. 
The condition in the impactor mechanism is more predictable than in 
the tool housing, is more controllable in design, and can be tested for possible 
sparking after construction. Most impactor mechanisms have relatively flat 
anvil/hammer surfaces, with little abrasion and surface shear occurring in 
use. Simple substitution of non-sparking 'alloys may be possible since the hard­
ness of non-sparking aluminum-bronze alloys (Rockwell B93) compares favorably 
with the steel materials (B90 to B92) sometimes used. However, only the tool 
designer in the original design process can adequately evaluate the substitution 
of these specified non-sparking alloys in the impactor section. Other factors 
under the designer's control include maximum impact pressure (the impactor 
surface area), the shape of the impactor surfaces, and the geometric impacting 
conditions. Using all the available designconditions the impact mechanism can 
be made safe from metal strike sparking. Test procedures simulating IVA and 
EVA use under long term normal and possible failure mode should be used to 
verify the adequacy of any materials/design compromise, should this become 
necessary.
 
Incandescent carbon wear particles. In some space power tool machinery 
we have situations where carbon elements are in sliding contact with metal 
surfaces. This occurs in the electric motor where carbon brushes run against 
metal slip rings or against metal commutator segments. In gas (air) powered 
tool motors the vanes may be carbon or they may be of phenolic-linen composition 
which can produce small fragments with high carbon content. The question is 
whether these particles may become incandescent and serve as a potential ignition 
hazard. 
The literature search shows only two cases translatable to potential space 
cabin hazards. One case is poor commutation of the electric motor. Poor 
commutation can be caused by vibration of the brushes, mechanical and electrical 
defects in the motor, high altitude effects in the brush, etc. Under poor commu­
tation, streamers of hot particles thrown out from under the brush are observed. 
These are organic impregnations in the brush material which are heated by 
sparking and arcing during the deficient commutation. A similar mechanism 
was observed by Buckley [ 21], whose group investigated sliding carbon wear 
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surfaces on metal both with and without an electrical potential across the carbon­
metal interface. Fires in combustible mixtures were generated by incandescent 
wear particles in these tests, but only when an electrical potential was placed 
across the carbon-metal interface. For incandescence, the values of voltage 
and current had to be above 106 Vac and 0.3 ampere. An electric power tool 
in normal use would carry more than this minimum current, but dc power tools 
would not be expected to-carry this order of voltage magnitude. The hot incan­
descent ejecta particles observed in electric motors undergoing poor commutation 
may be caused by momentary surge voltages generated by the motor circuit 
inductance and capacitance, which can operate during transient high-load 
electrical conditions and create surge voltages above this minimum. Under 
this condition the brush may be operating as a-special case of the "break" spark 
found in the ordinary switch. 
Electric power tool motors are known to.offer the hazard of hot incah­
descent ejecta particles from the carbon-brush metal interface. The gas 
powered vane motor is not known to show this source of ignition hazard when' 
operated with compressed air. 
Solid state reaction sparks. There are two solid-state chemical re­
actions which are possible within a space cabin. These solid-state reactions 
would not be directly.dependent on-the oxygen atmosphere and would therefore 
be an equal risk as a spark ignition source within or without the cabin. The' 
two reactions are: 
Fe 2 03 + 2AI -- A12 03 + 2Fe + AH (Exotherm) 
Ni + Al-- NiAl + AH (Exotherm) 
These two reactions are considered not only because they are thermodynamically 
capable of producing incandescent particles but also because the solid phases 
necessary for the reactions may be found throughout the construction of the 
spacecraft. The iron oxide reaction with aluminum is characteristic of several 
metals that can be replaced from their oxide lattice crystal formation by the 
very active aluminum atom. The oxides of manganese, chromium, vanadium, 
lead, and nickel are also capable of "thermite" reaction with aluminum. Alumi­
num reacting with iron oxide is the reaction which offers the greatest hazard 
potential since iron alloys and aluminum are frequent materials of construction 
within the space cabin and pow&r tools. 
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The oxide of iron forms normally on most steels and, since the reaction 
product occupies considerably more volume than the unreacted iron, has little 
adherence to the underlying base metal, the oxide is usually found scaling off 
as small particles. The oxides of iron progress from Fe 0 to Fe3 04 and finally 
to Fe 2 03, all of which will react. Such small particles, when struck by or 
against aluminum could become incandescent thermite spark sources. That 
impact is sufficient to ignite these sparks was quite well pointed our by Kingman 
et al. [ 22], working with aluminum paint on rusty steel. These investigators 
found no difficulty in striking thermite sparks of sufficient incendiveness to 
ignite combustible gases. All that was found necessary was two reacting com­
ponents and sufficient impact to start the reaction. Sources of energy such as 
electric sparks, hot surfaces, friction, and shear would also initiate the 
reaction in air. The most expected reaction would be between Fe 3 04 or Fe 2 03 
aluminum. The typical exotherm is: 
keal79 kmle3Fe3 04 + 8AI--4AI2 03 + 9Fe + kg mole 
Based on this exotherm the reaction can be classed among the high heat fuel 
reactions and such small incandescent particles would be a definite ignition 
hazard. 
Visible areas of rusty steel such as those with which these researchers 
worked are not expected inside a space cabin. However, some quantity of 
oxidation product from the several steels present could be expected and the 
presence of larger areas of aluminum would also present a situation favorable 
for the reaction. Such situations might be found where the aluminum housing 
of the hand tool (gas, electric, or hydraulic powered) might be struck against 
a steel surface. The ordinary impact metal-sparking characteristics of alumi­
num against iron are considered to be a "safe" or I"non-sparking't combination 
(discussed elsewhere in this report as metal "strike" sparks); however, slight 
iron rust would change this. 
While oxygen does not enter directly into this reaction, the oxygen 
atmosphere would be conducive to formation of iron rust; thus the cabin atmos­
phere is indirectly involved in forming one of the reactants. 
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Other areas where this reaction might offer danger in tool operation
 
would be inside the air tool rotating mechanism and at the anvil-hammer inter­
face on ordinary impactor mechanisms. The vane-to-housing interface in the
 
air tool usually finds the vanes running a tight fit with high rotational speed
 
against the aluminum tool housing. A particle of Fe2 03 would have opportunity
 
to find sufficient aluminum and initiation from impact/shear for thermite re­
action. The hammer-anvil impactor mechanisms usually are made of some
 
form of steel. Here an aluminum flake could find both impact and iron oxide
 
particles on the impact surfaces.
 
The nickel aluminides are formed-as a metallurigical solid-state reaction 
from pure nickel and aluminum [231. The reaction is highly exothermic and 
small particles can become incandescent. This material is used as a substrate 
bond coat in sprayed metal systems; part of its unique ability as such a universal 
bond coating is that it arrives on the metal surface in such a highly active exo­
therming condition. When pure aluminum powder particles coated with pure 
nickel are sprayed through an ordinary flame spray gun the metal particles are 
observed to be of maximum incandescence beyond the hottest part of the flame. 
They are found, in fact, to increase their temperature after passing through 
the flame because of the high exotherm of the Ni-Al solid state reaction. A 
temperature of 922 0 K (12000 F)can initiate this exotherm but no information 
is available indicating the impact sensitivity of the reaction [23, 241. 
A complete metallurigical solid solution series is formed between 100
 
percent aluminum toward 100 percent nickel. This metallurigical formula is
 
usually written:
 
(1-X) Al(s) + X Ni(s)-AI(1_X) + AH 
where X = Atom fraction of the component 
and S indicates reaction in the solid phase 
AH = Enthalpy change in cal/g-atom 
In the Ni-Al series four intermediate phases are known; all combinations are 
highly exothermic. Any combination above 0. 1 mole fraction of either material 
in the order exceeds 16 736 joule/g-mole (4000 cal/g-mole) in value for AH. 
For most exothermic solid-state pure metal reactions 16 736 to 25 f04 joule/ 
g-mole (4000 to 6000 cal/g-mole) is a high exotherm. The formation of nickel 
aluninides finds a maximum exotherm between 0.4 to 0. 6 mole fraction of nickel 
reacting with aluminum, with the peak exotherm going over 58 576 joule/g-mole 
(14 000 cal/g-mole). 
22 
. Aluminum is a common space cabin material, but free nickel is not as 
common. Nickel is sometimes usedto plate aluminum which is to be soldered 
or have a low temperature braze accomplished later. A spark drawn to such a 
housing would raise the temperature of the reactants and initiate the self sus­
taining exotherm. No data on the action of these two materials under impact 
is available from the literature. Comparing the thermodynamic data of the 
reaction, the reactants, and the products of the nickel-aluminide to the thermite 
reaction suggests that Ni-Al would be an impact-sensitive reaction. As such it 
would operate much as the strike sparks for sparking metals or: for impact 
generated thermite sparks. In the range of approximately equal mole fractions, 
especially when small flakes of either material were to be brought into intimate 
contact with the other reactant, an incandescent spark source could result which 
would be capable of serving as an ignition source. 
The pure chemistry and metallurgy of these two different solid-state 
reaction ignition hazards give only a part of the true picture. The conditions 
of 100 percent oxygen in the space cabin atmosphere and the EVA use of space 
power tools bring up additional physical considerations which will now be con­
sidered. 
Atmospheric constituents do not enter directly into either thermite or 
Ni-Al reactions. Once initiated, they occur equally well in any atmosphere, in 
any inert gas, or in the space vacuum (EVA) condition. Their direct reaction 
hazard does not depend on the presence of freely available oxygen. However, 
oxygen and the hard vacuum will affect the physical aspects of these reactions. 
First, the iron oxide reactant which is expected to be the only probable thermite 
reaction is formed from free atmospheric oxygen. The ignition hazard of this 
particular thermite reaction depends on the prior atmospheric oxygen history of 
the iron rust source. 
Since these solid-state reactions are hazards as ignition sources the total 
risk involves the potential for developing a fire in other fuel or combustible 
materials. The presence of free atmospheric oxygen will determine the potential 
effectiveness of these hot particles as fire starters. In the space vacuum the 
risk of fire from ignition by these particles is much lower; perhaps the only risk 
here is the potential burn-through of the pressure suit. 
The oxygen exposure history of the aluminum reactant in both reactions 
will also operate in a very special way to influence the potential hazard. The 
representation for these reactions is usually written as the chemical reaction: 
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Fe 2 O3 + Al­
or 
Ni + Al-
These type formulae alone imply the physical conditions: 
Fe 2 3  Al-+ 
Ion rust particle Pure aluminum reactant particle 
or 
Ni +1 Al 
Nickel reactant particle Aluminum reactant particles 
These are not true physical states of these materials under the usual Earth­
bound or space cabin atmosphere reacting conditions. A more precise physical
 
picture would be:
 
Fe2O3 Al 
ron rust particle with Aluminum reactant particle with 
adsorbed film. aluminum oxide film and adsorbed film. 
or 
Ni A 
Nickel reactant material Aluminum reactant material with 
with adsorbed film. oxidized aluminum film and adsorbed 
film. 
These sketches represent the more correct physical conditions of the atmospheric
 
reactants.
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The adsorbed films are only lightly held with forces on the order of 
Van der Wall's bonding levels. The most tightly held of these would be the 
polar adsorbants such as.water. These films are removed with only small 
energy' levels, can be penetrated rather easily, and do not serve to influence 
the reaction strongly. They are effectively destroyed by heating to a few 
hundred degrees. The aluminum oxide film is quite different from these other 
adsorbed films. The forces bonding the A12 03 within itself and to the base 
metal are quite high and very stable. The oxide surface is chemically inert 
and a highly refractory material. It is not broken or penetrated easily and if 
penetrated Will reform almost immediately in the presence of oxygen. 
There is no large volume change for aluminum oxidizing to aluminum 
oxide; therefore, there is no inherent sealing off of the oxide film as occurs 
during the formation of rust and other oxides. The result of increasing the 
energy level (heating, etc.) in the presence of atmospheric oxygen is to increase 
the diffusivity reaction of oxygen through the A1 2 O3 film; and consequently 
increase the depth of the protective alumina film. In the research by Pilling 
and Bedworth [25], the actual reaction of metals with oxygen in forming or not 
forming a protective film is indicated. Metals fall into two categories; the 
category to which aluminum belongs is among metals which do not ignite until 
after they melt. Melting and resultant liquid mobility causes rupture in the 
protective oxide film; effective high-temperature combustion (rapid oxidation) 
is also suppressed by the adherent alumina film and does not proceed until that 
film formation process is disrupted. The basic reactivity of pure aluminum 
metal is much higher than the reactivity found and expected in Earth atmosphere 
use. This reduction of apparent reactivity and the-performance and uses of 
aluminum on Earth is dependent on the peculiar combination of properties of 
the aluminum oxide surface, and the normal atmosphere in which we ordinarily 
use aluminum. 
In the space vacuum-we may have the physical conditions: 
or 
Here pure aluminum surfaces would not form or reform the protective film. 
Ufider conditions of hard vacuum the thermite and exothermic metallurgical 
reactions could proceed with: 
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I. Lower initiation energies than these same reactions in Earth 
atmospheres. 
2. Higher reaction rates than these same reactions in Earth 
atmospheres. 
Considering that these exotherms are equal to or above the energy levels 
for many fuel-oxygen combustion reactions they' should be investigated as cate­
fully and approached with as much caution as the increased risk of fire in 100 
percent oxygen. Under space vacuum, in drilling through aluminum with a steel 
bit or in cutting or shearing aluminum sheet with high-iron alloy blades, in 
chiseling, hammering, and othei maintenance operations, whether by powered 
or hand tools, the extra reactivity of non-oxidized aluminum surfaces can offer 
a greater potential hazard for producing incandescent solid-state reaction sparks 
than the same operations conducted inside the cabin or in Earth atmosphere. 
Hot Surfaces. 
Gas and hydraulic power. A survey was made of the minimum plate 
ignition temperature for various combustible fluids and gases which might be 
expected within the space cabin. This survey showed that under the maximum 
oxygen concentration expected in-any space cabin the minimum ignition tempera­
ture for hot surfaces would be 461 to 478°K (370 to 400°F). From this the 
maximum safe surface temperature for any exposed tool surface was considered 
to be 408 to 4220 K (275to 3000 F) in this report. 
The continuous flow of fluid in both hydraulic and gas powered tools' 
reduces the potential tool housing surface temperature rise well below the 
ignition temperature during normal operation of the tools. These two types 
of tools also show safe performance under high-load or stalled-loading conditions. 
Gas and hydraulic powered tools offer no hazard as potential hot-plate ignition 
sources under either normal or overload operation. 
Electric power. The electric tool has no internal flow of fluid which 
will carry off heat. The tool generates heat from two major sources, frictional 
heat in bearings and brushes and electric power resistance heat (I2R). Heat 
dissipation is by convection to the atmosphere and by radiation. Space conditions 
affect frictional heat, developed mainly in the brushes, and both major methods 
of heat dissipation. The interrelation between these factors is complex; there­
fore, the several vacuum tests on previous dc electric power tools and the well 
documented performance of brushes under vacuum were consulted to determine 
whether the maximum hot-surface temperature of 4226K (3000F) could be 
expected under vacuum conditions. 
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USAF report TDR-63-4227 documented the vacuum tests run on a 186-W 
(0. 25 hp) electric impact tool developed by the USAF for space uses. Tool 
housing temperature was measured at six points on the tool housing and an 
- 5atmosphere of near vacuum was held 6.7 x 107 3 N/m 2 (5 x 10 mm Hg). The 
test was run for over 2 hours on a duty cycle of 4 seconds on and 3 seconds off. 
A locking device prohibited the output shaft from rotating, which simulated a 
maximum load condition. During the two-hour test the thermocouples showed 
a maximum rise in temperature from around 292 0 K (65'F) to 353 to 3550K 
(175 to 1800F). 
During this test several problems were noted concerning the operation of 
the commutator brushes. Increased arcing was observed in all tests. In some 
tests the brush arcing was considered excessive and the test was halted because 
of it. Motor brushes were replaced with brushes developed by Stackpole Carbon 
Co. especially for exposed high-altitude use. These brushes also arced notice­
ably during the vacuum tests. Although the tests were not halted by test personnel 
because of visible arcing, the motor did run erratically during tests using these 
special brushes.
 
Inspection after the motor stalled showed that the copper brush leads 
had softened during the test and the brush sblder had also melted. Since most 
solders melt at temperatures above 408 to 4220 K (275 to 3000 F) and the softening 
point of copper is also over this temperature, the indication is that these motor 
brush temperatures were higher than the safe surface temperatures for hot­
surface ignition. The brush leads and solder are near the top of the brushes 
away from the running friction surface. It can be expected that the friction 
surface, the area on which the friction heat and resistance heat losses are 
developed, attained a higher temperature than did the soldered end of the brush. 
The Martin Company also developed other electric power tools for NASA 
and for experiments on the Gemini flights [ 5]. Tool housing temperatures were 
measured during vacuum tests in both development programs. Operations were 
usually conducted so that the tool was overloaded beyond its expected use. Case 
temperatures did not exceed the 344 to 355 0 K (160 to 1800 F) levels and show that 
the overall motor housing is not normally a hot-surface ignition problem. 
Problems were encountered in the same area of motor stalling, unexpected low 
speed operation and excessive electromagnetic radiation (interference). These 
problems were traced to the motor brushes. No information as to the temperature 
of the brushes was given in these two tests. 
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The higher brush temperatures and erratic brush operation experienced 
in all these tests can be expected. All the available literature on brushes shows 
that special problems are inherent in brushes operated at high altitude. These 
special problems have had considerable attention since the early 1940's. Since 
then regular operation of large numbers of motors on aircraft at high altitudes 
has been common and the problem and solutions have been studied. 
The major basic changes in high-altitude operation of brushes comes 
with increased arcing resulting from low gas pressure (already discussed inthe 
"switch sparks" section of this report) and the increase in friction of sliding 
solid lubricants operated at very low pressures. The basic studies have shown 
that solid lubricants depend on small amounts of certain adsorbed impurities 
to show the low friction characteristics [ 15, 20, 28] 
Carbon brushes, with the proper solid-state lubricant adjuvants, show 
normal friction coefficients of 0. 1. In high altitude operation, where all water 
of hydration is driven out of the brushes, the friction coefficients will suddenly 
increase to values 5 to 10 times normal. The result is catastrophic wear, 
excessive heat, and generally poor operation of the brushes [ 29]. 
The potential (voltage) drop across the brush-collector interface is 
also ,subject to small changes in the constriction resistance, which is in large 
measure a function of the condition of the solid films formed at the interface. 
Thus, constriction resistance becomes important in determining the electrical 
temperature generation. In the case ofhigh-altitude operation, the temperature 
is dependent on only small changes in the constriction resistance. This depen­
dence is shown in Figure 7. 
Considering that both friction heat and electrical heat generated at the 
brush-collector interface are higher and that either heat source may exceed 
the maximum safe ignition temperature (also considering that convective heat 
transfer in the vacuum is practically nil), it should be expected that the brush 
troubles evidenced in the tests are to be incurred under vacuum operation. 
Under stalled rotor or other failure mode of operation the tool housing 
surfaces would become excessively hot, but only after several minutes under 
stalled conditions. Since the tool will be hand held in use, continued long-time 
operation at stall can be avoided. The effects of shorted windings and even stall 
overload can be avoided by fusing the tool. The pressure suit and other pro­
tective outer gear and operation within a vacuum will prevent the astronaut 
from easily sensing a tool housing temperature rise. Therefore some additional 
device(s) should be built into the tool to indicate tool housing temperature to 
the astronaut during use. 
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FIGURE 7. CONSTRICTION RESISTANCE AS A FUNCTION 
OF TEMPERATURE 
The Power Tool as a Source of Fuel 
Metal Fuels. The major mass of material is composed of the metals of 
which the tools are manufactured and the metal structures on which the tools 
are used. Even though metals are not generally classed as fuels, we must be 
concerned with the fuel potential of metals in combustion reactions. From the 
standpoint of heats of combustion, metals compare favorably with recognized 
fuels. Table II shows the heats of combution of several spacecraft materials 
compared with several fuels. 
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TABLE IIL HEATS OF COMBUSTION
 
Combustion At. or J/kg BTU/lb
 
Fuel Products Mol. Wt. Fuel Fuel
 
Carbon (C) C02, CO 12 32 768 400 4 100 
Methane (CH 4 ) C02, H20 16 55 776 000 24 000 
Acetylene 002, H20 26 48 804 000 21 000 
(C2H2) 
Beryllium BeO 9 67 396 000 29 000 
(Be) 
Magnesium MgO 24 25 564 000 ii 000 
(Mg) 
Aluminum A120 3 26 30 2M2 000 13 000 
(Al) 
Titanium (Ti) Ti 20 3 47 15 803 200 6800 
Iron (Fe) FeO 56 4 648 000 2000 
In determining the relative value of a material as a practical fuel or as 
a hazard as a fuel, other properties must be considered. The reaction products 
of the combustion reaction have a large influence on the character of the reaction. 
Combustion of the common fuels listed above, such as carbon, methane, and 
acetylene, produce gaseous combustion products which do not interfere with the 
access of oxygen to the remaining hot fuel surface. Magnesium is a metal fuel 
which has a solid combustion product (MgO). The cubic oxide crystal particles 
formed,. however, are not compatible with the hexagonal crystal structure of the 
basic metal, and evolve from the combustion in a cloud of smoke composed of 
small white particles. This process is very similar to the combustion of the 
carbonaceous fuels listed above, and no interference is offered by the MgO 
product to the further combustion of the parent metal surface, Magnesium is 
therefore a threat as a metal fuel. This particular reaction is well known and 
usually is a major consideration in projected aerospace uses of magnesium. 
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Aluminum's reaction with oxygen has been mentioned previously. The 
reaction product is tightly adherent to the base metal-and serves effectively to 
block further rapid oxidation at normal temperatures. The temperature of 
aluminum must be brought well above the melting point of 933 0 K (12200F), or 
to about 12730K (18320 F), in the highly molten state, before the aluminum 
oxidation reaction will proceed as a self-supporting oxidation reaction; i. e. , 
before combustion will proceed [ 30]. While aluminum, from a chemical stand­
point, is as reactive as magnesium, and aluminum will supply more heat per 
pound of oxidized metal, because of the basic nature of its combustion aluminum 
is not a practical fuel. As a safety hazard, combustion of significant amounts 
of aluminum will not proceed unless there is another large combustion reaction 
preceding the high-temperature combustion of molten aluminum. Therefore 
aluminum is not a practical safety hazard. 
Titanium is similar to aluminum. Although the oxide reaction product 
is not as adherent, it will tend to protect the metal. Research on titanium 
combustion in 100 percent oxygen showed that titanium would ignite spontaneously
2xunder static conditions in pure oxygen and at pressures of 24. 13 105 N/m 
(350 psi) or more, but only if a fresh surface is created, such as by scraping 
the surface. Under dynamic conditions, such as material rupture under stress, 
x 104 N/m 2 the same condition applies, but down to pressures as low as 34.47 
absolute (50 psia). 
The practical value of any metal fuel, then, is complex and will depend 
on the heat of reaction; rate of reaction; ignition temperature; stability, physical, 
and chemical nature of the reaction products; dissociation pressure and heat 
capacity of the reaction products; and the specific conditions under which the fuel 
and oxygen are supplied. For solid metal fuels, no special differences in their 
oombustibilities can be found in space flight except for the potential for a much 
higher reaction rate in 100 percent oxygen. Safety considerations as are usual 
in aerospace work should be sufficient in selecting metal materials for power 
tools. 
Powdered metals offer a very different degree of hazard as a fuel supply 
than do solid metal fuels. Powdered metals dispersed in air form explosive 
mixtures with ignition temperatures much lower than those of the corresponding 
bulk metals [ 30]. Since a relatively high ignition temperature is the one com­
mon characteristic which puts most solid metals out of the class of a practical 
fuel hazard, the drastic lowering of ignition temperatures in the finely divided 
metal powders brings powdered metals definitely into the high-hazard category. 
Higher reaction rates when exposed in 100 percent oxygen atmospheres will 
add to this hazard. In addition, under zero or subgravity conditions the larger 
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particles of metal will tend to "float" and remain a part of the dispersed metal 
powder, with no natural falldown of such particles. Therefore, any process 
which produces small metal particles will be accumulative toward a hazardous 
situation. Production of metal chips and metal powder by tool operations, 
unless completely controlled, will bring about a definite safety hazard. Such 
operations will produce a dispersed metal fuel with inherent high heat release 
and inherent high rates of reaction, a fuel which can be ignited by common 
ignition sources. Such dispersed metal fuels should be considered as a hazard 
equal to highly combustible gaseous mixtures. 
The Electric Power Tool as a Source of Fuel. Provided the power tool 
is manufactured of metals ordinarily reasonably safe as fuels under 100 percent 
oxygen (i. e., not made of magnesium), then the only potential fuel supply from 
an electric tool will be contained in the content of the lubricants and the wiring 
insulation. 
The amount of lubrication required in. an electric power tool is small 
and under normal circumstances solid lubricants are used. Polytetron fluor­
ethylene (PTFE) and Teflon represent almost completely nonflammable lubricating 
materials. These materials are ignition-safe even in 100 percent oxygen. Dry 
molybdenum disulfide will not burn in air, but incandesces slowly in oxygen. 
Under these conditions the binders are expected to be the fuel contributor and 
may be controlled by specification to the MoS supplied. Tri-cresyl phosphate 
is accepted by the Canadian Fire Research Organization as the lubricant for work 
in oxygen, even though it will burn slowly under 100 percent oxygen. The quantity 
required in small electrical power tools is so small that this lubricant does not 
present a fuel hazard. 
There are several military standard and commercial standard types of 
wiring insulation which are accepted as nonburning or generally considered non­
combustible. Some of these materials will burn in 100 percent oxygen. Those -
that will burn include polyvinyl chloride, glass fiber and asbestos. PVC is 
typically one of the class of safe materials in air but unsafe in 100 percent oxygen. 
The glass fiber and asbestos materials are not inherently unsafe; they will burn 
only to the extent that they contain certain binders added in their manufacture 
which will burn in 100 percent oxygen but will not burn in air. Teflon and PTFE 
appear as good noncombustible electrical insulators along with specially made 
glass or,asbestos materials. 
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The mass of fuels represented b y the electrical insulation is large enough 
so that it does offer a threat 'as'afuel. Insulation 'mustbe carefully selected and 
tested under 100 percent oxygen conditions so that this threat is removed from 
the tool in its original -design stage. 
The Gas Power Tod1 ,asa Fuel Source. Provided the gas power tool is 
manufactured of metals, ordinarily reasonably safe as a fuel when used under 
100 percent oxygen (I e., not manufactured of magnesium), then the only 
potential'fuel supply from the gas tool will be contained in the lubrication required. 
The requirement for lubrication in the air tool is critical to its operation 
and is a continuous "flow through" type requirement. The last item in the air 
line feeding the air supply to the tool will be the lubricant reservoir and injector. 
Additionally, the tool may have its own internal lubrication reservoir. Most 
of'these systems operate with the amount being supplied giving an "oil-wet" 
exhaust condition, when being properly lubricated. This excess oil is carried 
off with the -exhaust air and diluted into the terrestrial shop atmosphere. 
Lubrication in the gas tool performs several vital functions other than 
reducing friction and wear [6, 31, 32]. The liquid lubrication medium is used 
as a thinline liquid pressure seal running at the vane-housing interface. It also 
assists in removing heat directly from the sliding vane-metal housing friction 
surfaces, and it flushes out particles in the motor. 
oil is vitally necessary for developing power in the air tool. This is 
illustrated by following the progressive deterioration sequence of an air motor 
running without lubrication: 
I. First, there is a drop in speed and power immediately upon losing, 
the pressure sealing function in the motor. 
2. The cylinder liner heats as a result of increased blade friction and 
the resulting charring of the vane-blade. 
3. An additional power drop which is caused by the char and dirt, 
which is no longer flushed out. 
4. There is scoring and excessive wear by accelerated abrasion. 
5. Further damage is done by worn blades riding at an angle and 
gouging the housing liner ,orby blades breaking and chipping off. 
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The minimum amount of oil usage appears to be two drops per minute 
0.0024 m3/s (25 cfm) being used. Approximately 0.00316 m3/s/W (50 cfm 
per horsepower) is required in the small fractional size motors. For a motor 
with 186 watts (0.25 horsepower), about 0. 0057 m3/s (i2 cfw) will be used 
near load speed, or an oil usage of one drop per minute per tool. If only a 
small percentage of this amount of ordinary lubricating oil accumulates in some 
part of the tool, it will represent a very hazardous fire situation. At some 
point the oil must be exposed to the 100 percent IVA environment unless the 
gas exhaust system is completely sealed and vented overboard. Such an oil 
vapor in 100 percent oxygen is one of the most volatile fuel-oxidizer mixes 
available. 
The gas power tool offers a fuel supply hazard that is inherent in the 
relatively large amount of "flow through" lubrication. The safety hazard is 
offered as pooled oil within the tool or as a vaporized fuel-oxidizer mix within 
the cabin. 
The Hydraulic Power Toolas a Fuel Source. The hydraulic power tool 
will have whatever fuel hazard is offered by the type of prime power used, 
whether electric or gas drive. In addition, it will have its own special potential 
contribution to the fuel hazard. 
The major contribution to a combustible fuel supply in all the types of 
power tools considered would easily come from the hydraulic power source. 
The amount of fluid circulating would cause a major problem if damage to the 
tool occurred. Ordinary leaks that are standard in such equipment would be 
excessive within a closed ecological system. The condition of being able to 
collect easily at a single point and to vent this effluent from ordinary leaks 
would not be as readily accomplished in the hydraulic system as it was for the 
pneumatic. 
Research has shown that the conditions in space cabins greatly increase 
the danger of conflagration should hydraulic fluid be let into the cabin. From 
this research, Figure 8 shows that all hydraulic fluids decrease in spontaneous 
ignition temperature (S. I. T. ) when the atmospheric oxygen content increases. 
This decrease is from S.1. T. of 644 to 6720 K (700 to 7500 F) for most high­
temperature hydraulic fluids at normal oxygen concentrations to 519 to 533K 
(475 to 500' F) at high (space cabin) oxygen concentrations. These so-called 
high-temperature fluids ignite at about the same temperature as the standard 
fluids under the high-oxygen condition. 
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The combination of high probability and the consequences of a hydraulic 
system fuel fire was considered to he too great to allow the use of hydraulics 
within the space cabin [ 2]. Another USAF study (as yet incomplete) recommended 
that only solid, brazed,, pressure-tested hydraulic joints be considered, and 
that no flexible hydraulic lines be allowed inside the manned compartment. 
The conclusion is that probably the most serious fire hazard is offered 
by the hydraulic power source. From a safety standpoint, this source is 
probably too dangerous for consideration. 
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TOXICOLOGICAL HAZARD 
The Electric Power Tool as aToxic Producer 
The electric power tool has two conditions under which it will produce 
potentially toxic substances, ozone produced at the brush-commutator interface, 
and pyrolysis products from overload failure or electrical fire in the tool. 
The production of ozone from oxygen fed through an electrical arc is a 
well-known phenomenon. The increased susceptibility toward arcing and sparking 
at the brush-commutator interface at low atmospheric pressures is also well 
documented. These two facts would support the potential for the brushes in 
an ordinary electric motor to produce ozone during use. 
The Martin Company, in developing the electric-drive Multipurpose Space 
Tool for both the NASA and USAF programs, tested their tools for ozone pro­
duction. These tests as described-were not complete enough to give assurance 
that all such electric tools, or even those tested, were sufficiently free of pro­
duction of harmful amounts of ozone. This remains a little-defined problem 
which must be fully proven by test before any open-brush motor is declared 
sufficiently free of ozone production to be safe from this hazard. 
The pyrolysis products from many electrical wiring insulations are more 
dangerous than the small fires which produced them. While the fire may be 
small, the contribution within a small-volume closed ecological system by pyro­
lysis.of the windings of only one motor would add to, approach, or exceed the 
threshold limit values set for these products. Most toxicological threshold limit 
values are based on 8-hour exposure for a working week. Toxicologists agree 
that these values must be drastically reduced within the space cabin. Here the 
occupants are under essentially a foreign atmosphere (i00 percent oxygen), 
exposed continuously, and the accumulative effects of many toxicants never 
before placed simultaneously must be considered. In addition, the environmental 
control systems have only limited capacity to remove solids and certain gases, 
and may be overloaded with only small amounts of unexpected toxicants. 
Part i of the Space Cabin Atmospheres study is devoted entirely to oxygen 
toxicity. Under the exposure conditions of spaceflight, especially long duration 
iO percent oxygen, even oxygen becomes suspect as a toxic gas. The additive 
effects of toxicants plus the relatively small real time experience for humans 
under such conditions requires the reduction to zero or near zero for foreign 
toxic materials. 
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The electric tool may produce ozone at the brush-commutator interface 
in amounts which can be dangerous and under fire-failure mode the pyrolysis 
of electrical insulations may be a greater hazard than the fire itself. 
The Gas Powered Tool as aToxic Producer 
The lubrication added to the tool appears as a toxic irritant even.in small 
amounts, and in accumulated running of a single tool over one hour (in the 
Apollo volume) will represent a systemic toxic level. 
The gas power tool produces a toxic condition inherent in itspresent 
design and operation. 
The Hydraulic Power Tool as aToxic Producer 
The hydraulic power tool will have the hazard inherent in the type of 
prime power driver. In addition, it will have the added hydraulic fluid from 
small leaks. For present hydraulic systems this would amount to a quantity 
added of approximately one-fourth that produced by the gas power source. 
SPECIAL TOOL HAZARDS 
In addition to the hazards listed above, these power sources offer certain 
special hazards. 
The electric tool may offer the electric shock hazard. The past electric 
tools, which were operated under 15 volts, do not offer a practical electrical 
shock hazard. Deciding precisely at what voltage we get into this type potential 
hazard may be difficult, but if operated under 30 volts, it seems that no practical 
hazard exists. 
The hydraulic tool offers a special hazard. The hydraulic fluid is operated 
at high pressures; if such a high-pressure line is broken, the high pressure 
spray of hydraulic fluid near the break is found to have a much lowered spon­
taneous ignition temperature. This effect is very similar to diesel injection 
ignition. T-is increased risk adds to the large fire hazard already discussed 
concerning this type power tool. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
This study has shown that hydraulic, electric, and gas power sources
 
offer safety hazards when used as space power tools.
 
The hydraulic power system must be driven by either an electric or 
gas power source and will therefore have the inherent disadvantages of the 
chosen prime power source. The hydraulic system offers a major fire hazard, 
especially should a failure occur in the hydraulic supply system. Because of 
this hazard it is recommended that hydraulic systems not be considered where 
there is any IVA. requirements. 
The gas power tool offers several hazards. Any tool housing manu­
factured of high-aluminum alloys will have a natural insulating, auto-oxidized 
surface or may have any extra thick anodized surface of aluminum oxide. Even 
if the aluminum is electrically grounded this surface film will be potentially 
effective in allowing an electrostatic spark to build up. 
There are two solid-state reactions which can occur to create incandescent 
hot particles. Both reactions involve aluminum metal. One reaction is aluminum 
with iron oxide (rust); in the other aluminum is reacting with nickel. Both will 
operate in either the presence (IVA) or absence (EVA) of gaseous oxygen. 
Both reactions may be initiated at lower temperatures and may react at faster 
rates in space because of the lack of free oxygen to form a protective film. Any 
drilling, cutting, or shearing of an aluminum/steel combination will involve 
this potential reaction. 
These solid state reactions are not a hazard peculiar to the air tool but 
may occur with any tool system where the two reactants are brought into 
intimate contact. 
The major disadvantage peculiar to the gas tool is found because of its 
high, continuous liquid lubrication requirement. This lubrication represents 
a fire hazard if accumulated into a small "pool" condition and offers a major 
hazard as a vaporized fuel expended into the 100 percent oxygen cockpit environ­
ment. 
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Dispersed lubrication accumulating within the environmental control 
system is also a toxicological hazard. 
There are also several hazards peculiar to the electric power tool. 
Unless the electrical wiring is chosen for its heat-failure mode under 100 
percent oxygen conditions the wiring may offer both a small fuel supply hazard 
and a larger hazard in its emission of toxic pyrolysis products. The metal 
case may strike sparks unless "safe" metals are used in its manufacture. The 
on-off switch may serve as a spark ignition source, especially on the break­
circuit conditiofi. 
Several hazards occur as a result of the requirement for carbon brushes 
carrying current through slip rings and commutators. The brushes may create 
the toxicant ozone; brush arcing and sparking will create radio magnetic inter­
ference (RMT or EMI). This arcing may also serve as an ignition source for 
gaseous combustibles or severely arcing brushes may eject incandescent carbon 
particles. The' hot brush surfaces may also serve as ignition sources. Brushes 
running in vacuum will be generally unreliable and have high or catastrophic 
wear [ 28]. 
Both the electric and gas power tools offer some hazard when used in 
space flight. Some research and development must be accomplished if these 
tools are to be considered as a completely safe power source. 
This study has shown-several hazards peculiar to tools, and also several 
that are important hazards not specifically limited to power tools. These hazrds 
will be listed again since they may apply in many aspects of space flight. 
. Production of free metal powder and chips in an IVA environment, 
especially if the environment is 100 percent oxygen, produces a highly com­
bustible mixture that can be ignited well below the bulk ignition temperature of 
the metal. 
2. There are two dangerous heat-envolving solid-state reactions of 
aluminum with iron oxide (rust) or nickel metal. These reactions may be 
initiated at lower energies and have faster, more energetic reaction rates 
in the hard space vacuum. 
3. Grounded aluminum structures may present an electrostatic spark 
hazard because of the ever present'alunina or insulhting film on the aluminum 
surface. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Neither the electric nor the -gas power tool is sufficiently safe. In, 
deciding which one of them will be improved there are three major consider­
ations: 
i. The development program mast resolve the major safety hazards
 
without sacrifice of tool performance or tradeoffs that will introduce other
 
hazards.
 
2. There should be high confidence in.the end result of the development 
program before it is undertaken. 
3. There should be no other outstanding deficiencies in the power source 
chosen for development which would effectively prohibit its real Value for use 
on active missions. 
This study has been conducted within the considerations of safety and 
reliability. From a safety standpoint all the inherently extra hazardous high­
energy fuel cycles have been eliminated. A previous study showed that even 
using maximum-energy cycles the gas power source was at a disadvantage when 
compared on a power versus fuel weight basis. With safety considerations 
limiting gas tools to only low energy pressure-work systems this disadvantage 
is increased. From the standpoint of weight requirement there is a practical 
question of whether such a power source could be accepted. 
Positive predictions of the improvement of the gas tool for use in space 
flight are also difficult. Where we have extensive statistical background of use 
of electric motors in many protected and exposed locations on high altitude air­
craft we have no equivalent background on air motors other than terrestrial 
shop use. Where the difficulties with the electric motor have been extensively 
researched and basically well defined both practically and theoretically, the 
development program for the gas power tool would have neither large amounts 
of practical information nor be based on deep theoretical knowledge about the 
processes involved. 
Suggestions to make use of some special advantage of the gas tool in 
order to increase its positive value are also difficult. It has been suggested
 
that such a tool use oxygen as the gas, and to supply the vented gas to the
 
cabin atmosphere as the human oxygen supply. The human oxygen requirement
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is much lower than the tool gas use requirement. On Gemini flights only 
47. 17 kg (104 lbs) of oxygen was carried including reserves for 2 men for 
14 days [ 33]. The long-term average use is expected to be 0. 9 kg (2 Ib) of 
oxygen consumed per day for each man. Figure 9 shows typical performance 
curves of a gas power tool of hand tool size (approximately 186 W or 0. 25 hp). 
The flow-rate requirements show that with a 50 percent on-off duty cycle only 
a few minutes of tool use would produce enough oxygen to satisfy the daily 
requirements of the astronaut. A more economical gas use mLy be effected 
through a development program but it is doubtful whether a gas power source 
can be brought into energy balance with the gas useage requirements of the 
human body. Any such scheme of use of the gas effluent from the tool inside 
the cabin brings the tool directly into the environmental control system loop 
and will generate additional problems. 
The electric power source offers a favorable contrast for possible 
improvement. Should the major safety hazards be eliminated the electric tool 
has other very favorable characteristics for use in space flight. 
Two development options offer some confidence in being able to make 
the.necessary improvements in the electric power tool. 
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One method would be to adapt the higher frequency ac induction motors, 
for space tool power source. Such a motor would operate on 300 Hz or higher 
ac power. Its advantages are known in ordinary shop use to be sufficient to 
shift some shops to this type tool in spite of the requirement for a frequency 
changer [34, 35]. It would remove most of the problems associated with a 
brush-commutated dc motor but would introduce the problem of obtaining and 
using a type of electric power not developed by the prime space-electrical 
systems. It would require a frequency changer and would also introduce the 
electrical shock hazard. 
The other electrical development option would be to adapt a new type of 
brushless de motor, previously developed by NASA for satellite and space 
power applications, to a configuration and size for use as a power tool drive. 
This development was previously accomplished by NASA and the Sperry 
Farragut Company [ 36, 37]. The objective on the original program was to 
develop a very small low-wattage motor for special use in hard vacuum space 
conditions. It is a true do motor and its unique properties and design are 
based on a photosensing solid-state commutator system. In this design the 
rotor is a permanent magnet while the stator contains the windings. A small 
light shield is attached to the rotor which rotates around a stationary lamp. 
The lamp is operated under derated conditions and a light beam passes out 
through the light shield. Photodiodes in the stationary commutator section 
sense the position of the rotor. Signals from the photodiodes control a solid­
state amplification and power switching system which energizes the proper 
stationary armature coils. The input dc power is thus switched and commutated 
without transfer through a brush or sliding contact and without transferring to 
a rotating electrical component. 
This system will eliminate the brush problems of arcing and sparking,
 
the potential to produce ozone, the hot-brush surface ignition hazard, high
 
friction and wear, and general low reliability of the brush commutator system.
 
• Because of the unique design, other safety improvements can also be 
accomplished. Since the stationary armature windings do not rotate it is 
practical to consider encasing these windings and pressurizing the case with an 
atmosphere safer than 100 percent oxygen. Such a hermetically sealed motor 
would have a much lower fire hazard from the electrical insulation but in case 
of fire could be built to contain the pyrolysis products. Thus even under failure­
mode operation the motor would fail-safe with respect to its potential toxic 
(fire) hazard. 
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Solid-state devices are used throughout the niain power.circuit. This 
allows the consideration in the design to use a low-power solid-state "gate" 
switching sub-circuit at the on-off motor switch. If accomplished, solid-state 
switching would allow the motor to be controlled by a power circuit where the 
order of magnitude for voltage and current would be 0. 5 to 0.75 V and 200 to 
300 mA, Accomplishing these low switching values and isolating this switching 
circuit from the main power circuit may allow the switch to be maintained at 
all times below both the critical minimum voltage and minimum current neces­
sary to produce the "break" switch spark. This would completely eliminate the 
switch as an ignition source. 
This motor to date has seen several specialized applications since the 
first low wattage (fractional horsepower) model was developed. There have 
been at least four different sizes designed for several different uses on satellite 
systems. Although no design suitable for use as a tool power drive has been 
produced, the original concept has been scaled up to a 746 W (I hp) motor 
pump drive. 
There should be no major limiting reason why this type motor cannot be 
produced in a size, power, and torque range suitable as a power tool drive. 
Since the solid-state commutator will be heavier and will occupy more volume 
than the brush commutator, design attention should be given to the possibility 
that some of the commutator system be placed at the source of power; i.e., 
in the tool battery housing for a portable system, or at the power plug in a 
ship-supplied system. 
The photodiodes and the power diodes produce some heat and this must 
be conducted away since these devices do not operate properly at temperatures 
above 3660 K (2000 F). Keeping these solid state devices cool may be the only 
design difficulty, but it should not be a limiting design condition. 
Several other features should be included in the motor development and 
design. The motor should have a simple system to indicate housing and internal 
temperatures. This may be a self-powered circuit (thermocouples) with a 
gauge indicator built into the rear of the case, or temperature indicating paints 
may be used. Several temperatures points should be measured so that localized 
heating would be registered. 
The power circuit should be protected with a fusing system so that sus­
tained electrical overload would not be possible. 
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Collateral with safety improvements in the m6tor it is recommended that 
studies be undertaken to: 
i. Investigate the ability of the insulating alumina film, formed on 
grounded aluminum, to store an electrostatic charge. Auto-oxidized and various 
anodized aluminum alloys, including the heavy hard coat process, should be 
investigated. Should the practical hazard from such electrostatic sparks be 
proven through this investigation, then conducting coating of nonauto-oxidizing 
metal should be developed. This thin coating would modify the surface of the 
aluminum so that effective insulating films would not form and the surface could 
be electrostatically grounded. Such a coating would not appreciably alter the 
favorable properties of weight, strength, and safe strike~spark characteristics. 
of the basic aluminum. It is suggested thatthe coating could be a 2 percent 
beryllium copper coating applied by flame spray or vacuum metalizing. In 
developing the coating a process must be used which will place it onto the 
conductive aluminum surface and effectively ground potential capacitative spark 
development. 
2. Investigate the solid-state reactions of iron rust with aluminum and 
nickel metal with aluminum while under the conditions of hard space vacuum. 
Quantitative values can be placed on the temperature of initiation and the rate 
of reaction by. a research method such as differential thermal analysis while 
under vacuum conditions. Whatever method of analysis is used it should be 
based on providing an atomically clean unoxidized aluminum reacting surface. 
It should provide practical and quantitative theoretical answers to the develop­
ment of incandescent sparks when performing drilling, cutting, and other 
operations in space on aluminum with rusted steel tool surfaces. 
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